Consequences of the Popular Election of Judges in Mexico
The popular election of judges will place individuals and businesses in a situation of significantly greater legal vulnerability than under the previous system.
Today, the first round of popular elections for ministers, magistrates, and judges at the federal and, in some cases, state levels will be held. The goal is to replace approximately half of the current members of Mexico's judiciary. The rest will be elected in June 2027.
This exercise is part of the 2024 Judicial Reform, which, among other elements, established the creation of a Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal to sanction judges and magistrates. This reform was complemented by the so-called "Constitutional Supremacy," which stipulates that changes to the Constitution cannot be challenged through legal means. Additionally, the Amparo Law was amended, establishing, among other things, that suspensions granted in these trials have no general effect.
With these amendments, the ruling party has virtually nullified the judiciary's ability to function as a counterweight to the other two branches of government. Far from resolving the problems of judicial inequity and corruption highlighted by former President López Obrador, the popular election of judges risks exacerbating them.
The fundamental difficulty in expecting a more independent and impartial administration of justice than in the past stems from the mechanism chosen to appoint judges. Even if the electoral design were flawless and only qualified candidates were included, popular elections carry the risk of encouraging rulings aimed at pleasing voters rather than ensuring the objective application of the law.
Unfortunately, the conditions for today's election fall short of even that hypothetical scenario. The requirements for applying for judicial office were minimal. With minor variations depending on the position, they included a law degree, a minimum grade point average, three or five years of legal experience, a three-page essay, five letters of recommendation, and little else.
At the federal level, the selection of candidates was, in turn, directed by the Morena party and its allies, as two of the three evaluation committees were controlled by the executive and legislative branches, both dominated by that party. After a judge granted an injunction to suspend the Judicial Reform, the judiciary’s committee suspended its activities, prompting the Electoral Tribunal to assign the selection of candidates for that branch to the Senate by means of a lottery. At the state level, a similar political dominance was possible, as Morena and its allies control the executive and legislative branches in most of the country’s states.
As a result, the selected candidates were, for the most part, aligned with the ruling party, possessing limited legal credentials and minimal judicial experience. Even more concerning, many appear to have ties to organized crime.
Furthermore, today’s popular election of judges will be practically unmanageable. In total, 881 federal positions will be elected, along with 1,800 at the state level. On average, each voter will receive between five and nine different ballots and must make between 50 and 150 individual choices. The problem is compounded by the fact that most people are unaware of the scope of the positions and will generally be unable to distinguish between the candidates.
Additionally, the complexity of the process and budget cuts will force the vote count to be centralized in the National Electoral Institute’s district offices. The lack of citizen participation in the count, Morena’s strategy of distributing “guides” and encouraging support for certain candidates, the existence of unopposed candidates, and the absence of a minimum participation threshold to validate the election turn the process into a redundant and misleading exercise for citizens. The loss of legitimacy in these judicial elections has weakened the foundations of democracy, an essential condition for peaceful coexistence in any modern society.
Together with the mentioned judicial reforms, the popular election of judges will place individuals and businesses in a situation of significantly greater legal vulnerability than under the previous system, with no guarantee of improved protection of their rights against government abuse or private misconduct, much less of an effective fight against crime and corruption.
Greater uncertainty in the application of justice will create a fragile basis for economic decisions, discouraging investment, business expansion, and innovation. It will be virtually impossible to obtain a favorable ruling in litigation against the government. This legal disadvantage will incentivize the misallocation of productive resources in the pursuit of government favors. All of this will further diminish the country’s already reduced prospects for medium-term economic progress.
This is an updated and expanded English version of a piece first published in El Financiero on May 28, 2025.
Manuel Sánchez holds a B.A. in economics from the Monterrey Institute of Technology (ITESM) and an A.M. and a Ph.D. in economics from The University of Chicago. He is a former Deputy Governor at the Bank of México, a Non-Resident Fellow at the SMU Texas-Mexico Center, a member of several boards of directors, and an Economic Advisor to Spruceview Capital Partners.